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OFF THE BEATEN PATH? THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S 
APPROACH TO TRIBAL COURTS’ CIVIL JURISDICTION 





Justice Ginsburg described Montana v. United States1 as “the 
pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.”2 But 
the path that federal and tribal courts have been directed to walk since that 
pivotal 1981 decision has proven to be more treacherous than expected. 
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the issue 
of whether Montana’s analytical framework (as the test from that case is 
commonly called) should be applied to determine a tribal court’s civil 
jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant when the claim arises on tribal 
land. The Court held that Montana should not apply to such a claim and 
that the tribal court had jurisdiction based on the tribe’s power to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal land.3 By that time, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for 
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had reached the opposite conclusion. These 
courts held that Supreme Court precedents limit tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers to the situations in which at least one of the two “Montana 
exceptions” is satisfied.4   
These opposing conclusions reflect a split at the circuit level over how to 
interpret Supreme Court precedents, especially Montana, dealing with tribal 
civil jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of tribal courts is a basic issue of great 
practical importance; like the judgments or orders of any court, tribal 
courts’ actions can be binding on parties and enforceable in other courts 
only if the tribal court has jurisdiction over the parties. When a tribal court 
issues an injunction or renders a judgment against a nonmember party, the 
tribal court’s finding of jurisdiction can be challenged in a U.S. district 
court. The federal court system is then faced with the task of deciding 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 2. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). 
 3. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810-11 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 4. See, e.g., Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1150-51, 1153 (10th 
Cir. 2011). 
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whether the tribal court has jurisdiction. In short, it is faced with deciding 
how to apply Montana.  
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the 
application of Montana most accurately reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
past decisions. The Ninth Circuit’s approach preserves the distinction 
between non-Indian fee land and tribal land (referred to as “the location 
factor” in this Comment) for purposes of determining whether civil 
jurisdiction exists. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hicks5 
downplays the distinction between tribal land and non-Indian fee land by 
incorporating it as a sub-factor considered under the Montana exceptions, 
this Comment argues that the Hicks approach is an aberration in the 
Montana line of cases. As the Water Wheel court explains, however, Hicks 
can be interpreted as consistent with past Supreme Court decisions.  
Part II provides an overview of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents; the case law of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits dealing 
with the issue; and policy concerns. Next, Part III suggests adoption of the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach to the application of Montana. Part IV offers a 
critique of this thesis. Finally, Part V restates this Comment’s conclusions. 
This Comment does not describe the development and current state of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember defendants, nor does it describe the 
broader shifts in the Supreme Court’s approach to tribal sovereignty.6 
Rather, this Comment offers an up-to-date analysis of a basic practical 
concern and a persistently controversial aspect of tribal sovereignty. 
II. Background 
A. Overview of Supreme Court Precedents 
Because this Comment explores the recent attempts to apply and 
interpret Montana v. United States, this part takes the case as its starting 
point, after providing some background, and reviews subsequent relevant 
Supreme Court decisions. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has repeatedly observed, “questions of jurisdiction over Indians and 
Indian country remain a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law, 
which is better explained by history than by logic.”7 Similarly, Douglas B. 
                                                                                                             
 5. 533 U.S. 343 (2001). 
 6. For an account that relates civil and criminal aspects of tribal jurisdiction (although 
now somewhat dated), see Thomas P. Schlosser, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers, 
37 TULSA L. REV. 573 (2001).  
 7. Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/5
No. 1] COMMENTS 189 
 
 
L. Endreson has written that the decisions handed down since Montana 
each “arose on specific facts that both framed the issue and were 
determinative of its outcome.”8 The following account will therefore be 
mainly historical, seeking to relate the relevant factual details of the major 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in more or less chronological order and then 
repeating a similar overview of decisions by the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits. Not only are the principles and holdings from these cases relevant, 
but also their factual contexts, so the necessity of a detailed inventory bears 
repeating. 
As will be shown, though the Court has attempted to limit sweeping 
language about the inherent sovereignty of tribes in the past three decades, 
it has never rejected two key concepts: (1) tribal power to exclude 
nonmembers as a basis for civil jurisdiction, and (2) the distinction between 
Indian and non-Indian lands for purposes of determining whether tribal civil 
jurisdiction is proper. Hicks challenged the latter concept;9 conflicting 
interpretations of the Hicks decision consequently lie at the heart of the split 
discussed in this Comment.   
Some context for the decision in Montana is necessary. Tribal 
jurisdiction over members of the tribe, whether criminal or regulatory, was 
well established by the time Montana was decided.10 Tribal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers, however, was still being defined. The Court established 
that tribes retain “those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or 
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”11 
Today, however, the rule is harder to define. In holding that tribes lack 
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute nonmembers,12 the Court’s important 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe decision set the stage for new 
limitations on tribal sovereignty.13 Importantly, however, the Court declined 
                                                                                                             
 8. Douglas B. L. Endreson, Reconciling the Sovereignty of Indian Tribes in Civil 
Matters with the Montana Line of Cases, 55 VILL. L. REV. 863, 874 (2010). 
 9. 533 U.S. at 359-60. 
 10. Neil G. Westesen, From Montana to Plains Commerce Bank and Beyond: The 
Supreme Court’s View of Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Members, in 2 NATURAL RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 9-1, 9-10 & 9-11 (Rocky Mountain Min. L. Found., 2011).  
 11. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, Indian 
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193 (2004). 
 12. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), superceded by 
statute, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
 13. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 
32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 397 (2008) (asserting that the Oliphant decision represents the 
beginning of a modern attack on tribal sovereignty). 
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to extend the Oliphant rule to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, 
leaving the issue open for development on a case-by-case basis.14  
The extent of tribal courts’ jurisdiction has been explained in relation to 
both tribal regulatory power and the location of where the claim arose. The 
Court has held that “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”15 The location 
factor (whether the claim arose on reservation land held by an Indian versus 
land held in fee by a non-Indian) has also historically been accorded great 
weight in the Court’s analysis of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction (absent an act of Congress) over 
cases in which a nonmember sues an Indian over a transaction taking place 
on reservation land.16   
The seminal decision in Montana provides the framework for 
considering whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over nonmembers and 
remains the most important case dealing with this issue. As a result, 
Montana must be the starting point for any discussion of the narrower issue 
of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember defendants.17 The case arose 
from the Crow Tribe’s attempt “to prohibit all hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers” within its reservation.18 In its decision, the Court addressed 
two issues: (1) “whether the United States conveyed beneficial ownership 
of the riverbed [of the Big Horn River] to the Crow Tribe,”19 and (2) “the 
question of the power of the [Crow] Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing 
and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the 
Tribe.”20  
With regard to the first issue, as the Court summarized, the Crow Tribe 
“[sought] to establish a substantial part of their claim of power to control 
hunting and fishing on the reservation by asking [the Court] to recognize 
their title to the bed of the Big Horn River.”21 The Court flatly rejected this 
claim, holding that in this case, the language of the treaties relied on by the 
tribe could not rebut the “strong presumption against conveyance” of title to 
the Big Horn River.22 As to the second issue, the Court’s analysis addressed 
                                                                                                             
 14. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985). 
 15. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). 
 16. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1959). 
 17. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 445.  
 18. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981). 
 19. Id. at 550-51. 
 20. Id. at 557.  
 21. Id. at 550. 
 22. Id. at 552-54. 
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two possible sources of tribal authority to regulate non-Indian (and 
therefore nonmember) fishing and hunting: the previously mentioned 
treaties and the inherent sovereignty of the Crow Tribe.23 It proceeded to 
systematically reject each potential source of authority in turn in parts III.A 
and .B of the opinion.  
Part III.A explained that the alienation of reservation lands must 
influence the Court’s interpretation of the treaty.24 While the treaty 
establishing the Crow reservation may have established the tribe’s authority 
to regulate hunting and fishing on lands used exclusively by the tribe, such 
authority had been compromised by the subsequent “allotment and 
alienation of tribal lands . . . .”25 The Court also rejected the argument that 
the treaties had been “augmented” by 18 U.S.C. § 1165.26 In sum, because 
non-Indians could no longer be excluded from the land in question, tribal 
authority to regulate activities on those lands had dissipated. In addition to 
reaching this conclusion, the court also held that the tribe has jurisdiction to 
regulate nonmember conduct on tribal land--land that is still owned by the 
tribe or held in trust for the tribe by the United States.27 
Proceeding to Part III.B, the Court stated that as a general rule, tribes do 
not have jurisdiction over nonmembers. Relying on United States v. 
Wheeler, the Court explained that, 
in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian 
tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal 
membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and 
to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. But exercise of 
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with 
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without 
express congressional delegation.28  
The Court then identified two exceptions (now usually called the Montana 
exceptions) to “these general principles,” which will support tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers “even on non-Indian fee lands.”29 The first 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 557. 
 24. Id. at 561. 
 25. Id. at 558-59. 
 26. Id. at 561-62. 
 27. Id. at 557 (holding that “the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or 
fishing on land belonging to the Tribe.”). 
 28. Id. at 564 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 565-66. 
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exception applies when a nonmember consents to tribal regulation: “A tribe 
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of 
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.”30 The second exception applies when nonmember “conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”31 “[T]he bar is set 
exceedingly high” for the latter exception.32 Indeed, neither exception was 
held to apply to the situation in Montana, and the Court consequently struck 
down the Crow Tribe’s attempted prohibition of nonmember hunting and 
fishing on non-Indian fee land.33  
Almost immediately after the decision in Montana, the Court delivered 
another important decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.34 The 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe had enacted a tax that “applie[d] to any oil and 
natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands.”35 Upholding the 
tribe’s authority to enact the tax, the Court confirmed that “a hallmark of 
Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands, 
and that this power provides a basis for tribal authority to tax,” although the 
power to exclude nonmembers does not form the only basis of that 
authority.36 The Court reasoned that the authority to tax also derives “from 
its power to govern and to raise revenues to pay for the costs of 
government.”37 There was, therefore, a range of sources from which a tribe 
could derive the requisite authority to impose a tax on nonmembers.  
Nonetheless, the Merrion Court held that the power to exclude non-
Indians from the reservation would have been sufficient by itself to support 
the tax.38 Unlike in Montana, where the power to exclude was only 
mentioned briefly, the Merrion Court explained this aspect of tribal power 
in some detail.39 “Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 565. 
 31. Id. at 566. 
 32. Westesen, supra note 10, at 9-23. But see Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., 
Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 940 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the second Montana exception was satisfied where a nonmember security agency forcibly 
intervened in a dispute over tribal government); see also infra Part II.C.  
 33. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67. 
 34. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
 35. Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Id. at 141. 
 37. Id. at 144.  
 38. See id. at 149. 
 39. See id. at 144-45. 
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subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them.”40 In other words, even if a 
nonmember is initially allowed entry or access without any restrictions, the 
tribe retains its authority to impose new conditions after the fact. 
Furthermore, “Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a 
nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember’s presence and conduct on 
Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to 
impose.”41 Under Merrion, it would seem that consent is not required when 
the claim pertains to activity on tribal land.42  
Subsequent cases also supported tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember 
defendants when the claim arose on tribal land. For instance, in National 
Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians,43 the Court 
decided whether a nonmember defendant being sued over a claim arising on 
non-Indian owned reservation land was required to exhaust its tribal court 
remedies before seeking an injunction against the tribal court in federal 
court. The Court did not directly decide whether jurisdiction was proper 
but, perhaps even more importantly, declined to extend Oliphant’s 
prohibition on tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember criminal defendants 
to the context of tribal civil jurisdiction.44 As the Court explained, “If we 
were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that any exhaustion 
requirement would be completely foreclosed because federal courts 
would always be the only forums for civil actions against non-Indians.”45 
The National Farmers Court thus intentionally left open the possibility that 
tribal courts would be able to exercise civil jurisdiction over claims against 
nonmember defendants arising on non-Indian lands.  
In another important case, where an Indian worker who suffered an 
injury on reservation land had sued his Indian employer and a non-Indian 
insurance company, the Court upheld tribal civil jurisdiction over the non-
Indian defendant.46 In this case, Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. at 144. 
 41. Id. at 147. The precise language used by the Court is worth quoting in full, 
especially with regard to consent, since at least one recent decision regards absence of 
nonmembers’ consent as critical. See Rolling Frito-Lay Sales LP v. Stover, No. CV 11–
1361–PHX–FJM, 2012 WL 252938, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2012), discussed infra Part II.B; 
cf. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008). 
 42. See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983) 
(holding that a state may not restrict a tribal government’s regulation of hunting and fishing 
on tribal lands in accordance with federal law).  
 43. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
 44. See id. at 855.  
 45. Id. at 854.  
 46. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11, 19 (1987). 
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LaPlante, the Court explained the underlying policies supporting its 
decision. In an important passage, it explained, “Tribal authority over the 
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal 
sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the 
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or 
federal statute.”47 This principle provides the link between tribal 
sovereignty (which entails the power to exclude nonmembers explained in 
Merrion) and the scope of tribal court’s jurisdiction over nonmembers. The 
Court later cautioned that this language “does not limit the Montana rule,”48 
nor does it “expand or stand apart from Montana’s instruction on ‘the 
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe.’”49 The LaPlante Court 
nonetheless recognized Congress’s longstanding policy favoring tribal self-
government and the vital importance of developing tribal courts.50  
In contrast to LaPlante, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court applied Montana and struck down a 
tribal zoning regulation of reservation land held in fee by nonmembers.51 
But “[t]he issue split the Supreme Court into three separate opinions and the 
process of determining what the Court ultimately concluded is a 
complicated exercise all by itself.”52 For purposes of this Comment, 
Brendale is simply another instance in which the Court linked the location 
factor to the application of Montana’s analytic framework. The importance 
of the location factor was again reinforced by a later case, Atkinson Trading 
Company v. Shirley, in which the Court applied the analysis from Montana 
to a dispute over a Navajo tax on a nonmember hotel situated on alienated 
reservation land.53 The Court held that Montana’s general rule applied to 
the dispute and that neither Montana exception was satisfied; the tribal 
court therefore lacked jurisdiction.54 It explained that Montana’s 
“delineation of members and nonmembers, tribal land and non-Indian fee 
land, stemmed from the dependent nature of tribal sovereignty,” describing 
the link between the location factor and the extent of a tribal court’s civil 
jurisdiction.55  
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 18 (citations omitted); see also Westesen, supra note 10, at 9-21. 
 48. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). 
 49. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). 
 50. LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 14-15. 
 51. 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989). 
 52. Westesen, supra note 10, at 9-21. 
 53. 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001); see also Endreson, supra note 8, at 881. 
 54. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 647.  
 55. Id. at 650.  
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Importantly, Atkinson also related the Merrion decision to the Montana 
line of cases. The Court explained, “Merrion . . . was careful to note that an 
Indian tribe's inherent power to tax only extended to ‘transactions occurring 
on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members.’”56 
Atkinson “stated the divide [between Montana and Merrion’s theories of 
tribal jurisdiction] as plainly as it could: Merrion applied to tribally-owned 
land, and Montana applied everywhere else.”57 This summary of the 
“divide” is important to remember because it forms the basis of the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach in Water Wheel.  
The connection between a tribe’s power to exclude and its power to 
regulate nonmembers was reaffirmed in South Dakota v. Bourland.58 The 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had announced that it would prosecute anyone 
who hunted deer on reservation land without a license issued by the tribe 
and that it would not recognize state hunting licenses.59 The hunting 
activities the tribe sought to regulate took place on land that had been 
conveyed to the United States under several acts of Congress, including the 
Cheyenne River Act.60 The Court explained that the power to exclude forms 
a basis for regulatory power, but such power is extinguished when the land 
is transferred to nonmembers.61 “Montana’s framework for examining ‘the 
effect of land alienation’” was held to apply in this case because the land 
conveyed to the United States was sufficiently similar to the alienated land 
held in fee by non-Indians in Montana.62  
In Strate, the Court tried to limit the implications of its past statements 
on the inherent sovereignty of tribes, especially language from LaPlante.63 
The petitioners argued that Montana should not apply because the accident 
giving rise to the claim in that case occurred on land held in trust for the 
tribes (a state highway within the reservation).64 The Court rejected that 
argument, holding that Montana applied to the issue presented.65 
Nonetheless, it did not reach this conclusion by rejecting the distinction 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. at 653 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Winter King et al., Bridging the Divide: Water Wheel’s New Tribal Jurisdiction 
Paradigm, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 723, 747 (2011-2012). 
 58. 508 U.S. 679 (1993); see also Westesen, supra note 10, at 9-25. 
 59. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 685. 
 60. See id. at 683. 
 61. Id. at 689.  
 62. Id. at 692. 
 63. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 448-53 (1997). 
 64. Id. at 454. 
 65. See id.  
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between tribal land and land held by nonmembers. Rather, the Court held, 
“in accord with Montana . . . tribes retain considerable control over 
nonmember conduct on tribal land. On the particular matter before us, 
however, we agree with respondents: The right-of-way North Dakota 
acquired for the State’s highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, 
for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land.”66 In 
other words, the Court preserved the distinction between tribal land and 
non-Indian land used in Montana (and subsequent cases) and found a place 
for the claim at hand within that framework.  
On the other hand, the Court seemed to lean strongly against finding 
tribal jurisdiction to rest on any grounds other than the Montana exceptions. 
It explained that without federal authorization “tribal jurisdiction over the 
conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”67 Going 
further, the Court cautioned that its decisions in National Farmers and 
LaPlante placed no new limits on the reach of Montana’s holding.68 In the 
same breath, however, the opinion reiterated the established limit on 
Montana’s application. The Court expressly stated that Montana provides 
the rule and exceptions “[r]egarding activity on non-Indian fee land.”69  
The decision in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle 
Company,70 has been regarded by at least one commentator as inflicting a 
nearly fatal blow to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers and their 
activities.71 A cattle company owned by two members of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Indian Tribe had sued the Plains Commerce Bank in tribal 
court to prevent the company’s eviction from reservation land that the bank 
had sold to nonmembers.72 The U.S. Supreme Court held that neither of the 
Montana exceptions applied and, consequently, the tribal court did not have 
jurisdiction.73 It repeated that tribes “may . . . exclude outsiders from 
entering tribal land,” but also explained the limits on tribal regulatory 
authority over nonmembers in uniquely strong terms.74 The passage dealing 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 445. 
 68. See id. at 453. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 554 U.S. 316 (2008).   
 71. See Cullen D. Sweeney, Note, The Bank Began Treating Them Badly: Plains 
Commerce Bank, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Tribal Sovereignty, 33 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 549 (2008-2009). 
 72. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 320-22. 
 73. Id. at 318. 
 74. Id. at 327-28. 
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with tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction over nonmembers is worth quoting 
at length because of its great influence:  
Not only is regulation of fee land sale beyond the tribe's 
sovereign powers, it runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to 
tribal regulatory authority without commensurate consent. . . . 
And nonmembers have no part in tribal government--they have 
no say in the laws and regulations that govern tribal territory. 
Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly imposed 
on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented, either 
expressly or by his actions. Even then, the regulation must stem 
from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on 
entry, preserve tribal self-government, or control internal 
relations.75 
The Court further explained, in the omitted part of the above-quoted 
passage, that tribal sovereignty exists outside of the U.S. Constitution’s 
framework and beyond the protective reach of the Bill of Rights.76 The 
entire passage might seem to be in tension with the earlier explanation of 
the irrelevance of nonmembers’ consent to jurisdiction found in Merrion.77 
The key difference is that the regulation upheld in Merrion, unlike in Plains 
Commerce Bank, was of nonmember activity on tribal lands.  
This key distinction between tribal land and land held in fee by non-
Indians was explained away in Nevada v. Hicks.78 While it is not the latest 
case chronologically (it was handed down in 2001, before Plains 
Commerce Bank), Hicks is the case that diverges most clearly from the line 
of cases interpreting Montana. The dispute giving rise to the case took 
place on the property of a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of 
western Nevada, within the borders of the tribe’s reservation.79 After a 
search of his home by state game wardens for evidence that the tribal 
member, Hicks, had killed protected bighorn sheep outside of the 
reservation, Hicks brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the tribal 
court.80 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the tribal court lacked 
jurisdiction over the claim because the tribes did not have “legislative 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 337 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982). 
 78. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 79. Id. at 355-56. 
 80. Id. at 356. 
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authority to restrict, condition, or otherwise regulate the ability of state 
officials to investigate off-reservation violations of state law . . . .”81 
The holding of Hicks has (potentially) placed severe limits on tribal 
court’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers because of its treatment of the 
location factor. The case's holding is identified easily enough:  
The ownership status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in 
determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers 
is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.” It may sometimes be a dispositive factor. . . . 
But the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to 
support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers.82  
Hicks subordinates the distinction between tribal land and non-Indian fee 
land to a position as one factor among many to be considered under the 
second Montana exception. But the difference in approaches among the 
federal circuits stems only indirectly from the quoted passage; the real point 
of contention is how narrowly (or broadly) Hicks’s holding is to be applied. 
More simply, does Hicks apply to every case involving a nonmember 
defendant, or is it limited to cases involving “the question of tribal-court 
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law”?83 
In summary, except for in Nevada v. Hicks, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions consistently describe how the Montana exceptions are to be 
applied. First, a court must decide whether the claim arose on non-Indian 
fee land (or other similarly alienated land) within the reservation. If the 
claim did indeed arise on non-Indian fee land or alienated land, then the 
tribal court has jurisdiction over nonmember activities on the land only if 
one of the Montana exceptions is satisfied. On the other hand, if the 
nonmember activity takes place on tribal land, then under Merrion the 
tribal court has civil jurisdiction based on tribal authority to exclude 
nonmembers. Importantly, though, this is emphatically not the case with 
regard to criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers; tribal courts never have 
jurisdiction over nonmember, non-Indian criminal conduct, even when it 
takes place on tribal lands.84 
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 82. Id. at 360 (citations omitted). 
 83. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 (2011) 
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Under the broader reading of Nevada v. Hicks, the Montana rule would 
always be the test applied when a claim is brought against a nonmember in 
tribal court. The location factor would be considered within the framework 
of the Montana test but would not determine whether the case falls under 
Montana in the first place. This point is worth emphasizing because it is 
where the Ninth Circuit has departed from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits: 
the Water Wheel decision differs because it distinguishes Hicks as being 
limited to its unique factual situation.85 The Ninth Circuit has effectively 
adopted the narrower analysis explained in the previous paragraph, while 
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the broader approach. The 
development of the Ninth Circuit's approach, culminating in the Water 
Wheel decision, is described in the next part. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
The Ninth Circuit has resisted treating the Montana exceptions as an all-
purpose test for tribal jurisdiction over nonmember defendants. Rather, the 
location factor is a threshold issue. Under this approach, if the claim arose 
on reservation land held by a non-Indian, then Montana’s analytical 
framework applies: the tribal court will only have jurisdiction over the 
nonmember defendant if the requirements for at least one of the Montana 
exceptions are satisfied. Yet, as will be shown below, even in the Ninth 
Circuit there is still contention over which direction U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent points with regard to the location factor.86 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the location 
factor as a threshold issue in Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Red 
Wolf,87 a pre-Hicks decision that helps illustrate how the Ninth Circuit’s law 
of tribal civil jurisdiction has developed (or gone full circle) in the past 
decade. Red Wolf also involved somewhat infamous procedural problems 
that will bear mentioning later in this Comment.88 The case began with the 
wrongful death claims brought by the estates of two Crow Tribe members 
who were killed when a train belonging to the defendant railroad company 
                                                                                                             
of 2013, which “recognizes tribes’ inherent power to exercise ‘special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction’ . . . over certain defendants, regardless of their Indian or non-Indian 
status, who commit acts of domestic violence or dating violence or violate certain protection 
orders in Indian country.” Office of Tribal Justice, Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 
Reauthorization 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/tribal/vawa-tribal.html 
(last visited July 6, 2013). 
 85. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 813.  
 86. See infra Part III.B. 
 87. 196 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 88. See infra Part II.D.  
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collided with their vehicle at a crossing within the Crow reservation.89 The 
tribal court’s judgment was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
remanded it to the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana for 
reconsideration in light of the Court’s 1997 decision in Strate.90 The district 
court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.91  
The location factor was treated as determinative of whether the Montana 
analysis (treated as a general rule with two accompanying exceptions) was 
applicable.92 Red Wolf summarized “Montana’s main rule” as providing 
“that, absent the contrary intervention of treaty or federal law, a tribe has no 
civil regulatory authority over non-tribal members for activities on 
reservation land alienated to non-Indians.”93 The location of where the 
claim arose was addressed as a “threshold question.”94 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the railroad crossing was “indistinguishable for analytic purposes 
from the right-of-way at issue in Strate.”95 The Montana rule therefore 
applied, and the Ninth Circuit held, that neither of the two Montana 
exceptions was satisfied.96 The tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the 
claim, and the defendant railroad company was not required to exhaust its 
tribal court remedies.97 In Red Wolf, the location factor was not considered 
under the Montana analysis itself; instead, it was determinative of whether 
Montana’s general rule and analytical framework applied to the claim at all.  
After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hicks, the Ninth Circuit was 
seemingly at an impasse with regard to the location factor, but it hesitated 
to take a definitive stance, as illustrated by its reasoning in Smith v. Salish 
Kootenai College.98 In that case, the Ninth Circuit upheld tribal civil 
jurisdiction when a nonmember filed a claim against a tribal entity (Salish 
and Kootenai College) in tribal court and, after receiving an unfavorable 
verdict, challenged the subject matter jurisdiction.99 The court failed to 
unequivocally state what the Hicks decision meant for the location factor, or 
how the Ninth Circuit might decide in the future with regard to tribal 
                                                                                                             
 89. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 196 F.3d at 1062. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See id. at 1062-63. 
 93. Id. at 1062. 
 94. Id. at 1062-63. 
 95. Id. at 1066. 
 96. Id. at 1064-65. 
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 98. 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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jurisdiction over nonmember defendants when the claim arose on tribal 
land. Citing Hicks, it explained, 
[W]here the nonmembers are defendants, the Court has thus far 
held that the tribes lack jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the 
claim arose on Indian lands. . . . Our own cases, however, 
suggest that whether the tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction 
over a nonmember defendant may turn on how the claims are 
related to tribal lands.100  
Unlike courts in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit was 
thus far unwilling to interpret Hicks to stand for a definitive rejection of the 
location factor, leaving room for further interpretation. Although the Ninth 
Circuit seemed to shift to a theory of tribal civil jurisdiction based on status 
of the litigants in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco 
Company,101 it did not address the location factor. Instead, it considered 
only whether Montana was limited in its application to nonmember 
defendants, an issue separate from the one under consideration in this 
Comment.102  
The Ninth Circuit took a more affirmative stance in Water Wheel Camp 
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance.103 In this important case, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation of Hicks and based the tribal court’s 
civil jurisdiction on the tribes’ power to exclude nonmembers from tribal 
land rather than the Montana exceptions.104 The facts of the case were as 
follows: the Colorado River Indian Tribes (“CRIT”) leased tribal lands to a 
non-Indian resort, Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc.105 When the 
time came to renegotiate the lease, the parties failed to reach an agreement, 
and the resort subsequently refused to vacate the property, stopped paying 
rent, and continued to serve patrons.106 The CRIT then sued both the non-
Indian resort and its non-Indian owner in tribal court.107  
The Water Wheel opinion relies on an interpretation of the Supreme 
Court precedents that recognizes the distinction between tribal land and 
non-Indian land, treating the location factor as a threshold issue. The Water 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. at 1132 (citations omitted). 
 101. 569 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 102. Id. at 940. 
 103. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 104. Id. at 805.  
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Wheel court interpreted Montana as “limit[ing] the tribe’s ability to exercise 
its power to exclude only as applied to the regulation of non-Indians on 
non-Indian land, not on tribal land.”108 Perhaps most importantly, the 
opinion distinguishes Hicks as limited to its own narrow circumstances: 
“Hicks expressly limited its holding to ‘the question of tribal-court 
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law’ and left open the 
question of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants 
generally.”109 By interpreting Hicks narrowly, the Ninth Circuit was able to 
preserve the distinction between tribal lands and non-Indian fee lands for 
purposes of its analysis.  
Commentators have argued that the Water Wheel decision “resolved a 
long-standing divide between two lines of U.S. Supreme Court precedent” 
namely, the progeny of the Montana and Merrion decisions, respectively.110 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Water Wheel, “[w]hile recognizing the 
limited exception for competing state interests that the Supreme Court 
created in Nevada v. Hicks . . . recognized that a tribe’s status as landowner 
is sufficient in and of itself to support tribal regulatory and adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over those who enter tribal lands.”111 In so doing, Water Wheel 
resolved the question (for the Ninth Circuit at least) of whether Montana’s 
analysis applies to tribal land or, alternatively, whether the tribal power to 
exclude articulated by Merrion could serve as an independent basis for 
tribal civil jurisdiction after Hicks.112  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona declined to follow the 
Water Wheel decision in Rolling Frito-Lay Sales LP v. Stover.113 In this 
case, a non-Indian (Stover) filed an action in tribal court after slipping on a 
box at the On–Auk–Mor Trade Center and suffering an injury.114 The On–
Auk–Mor Trade Center was owned by a tribal member and was located 
within the borders of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Reservation.115 
The district court characterized the Water Wheel decision as inconsistent 
“with the [U.S. Supreme] Court’s post-Montana decisions.”116 It went on to 
                                                                                                             
 108. Id. at 810. 
 109. Id. at 813. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct., 7 Am. Tribal Law 652, 659 
(Navajo 2008) (interpreting Hicks as being expressly limited “to the question of tribal court 
jurisdiction over state officials enforcing state law”).  
 110. King et al., supra note 57, at 724.  
 111. Id. at 757. 
 112. See id. at 724-25. 
 113. No. CV 11-1361-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 252938 (D. Ariz. Jan 26, 2012).  
 114. Id. at *1. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *2. 
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add that “[Montana] could hardly be pathmarking if it did not apply to 
tribal land within a reservation.”117 Under Hicks and Plains Commerce 
Bank, the court reasoned, the contention that Montana was to be read 
narrowly as applying only to non-Indian fee land was untenable.118 
Additionally, the district court stated, “subjecting non-Indians to the 
jurisdiction of a tribal court without their consent would subject them to an 
entity outside the Constitution. . . . Government with the consent of the 
governed is everything in America.”119 The Rolling Frito-Lay court seemed 
to echo the language of Plains Commerce Bank, but applied its reasoning to 
claims arising on tribal lands per the holding from Hicks.  
The law in the Ninth Circuit has therefore been unstable at best. The 
Ninth Circuit has seemingly come full circle from Red Wolf to Water 
Wheel. However, it is easy to cast the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Water 
Wheel in too radical a light. Setting aside, for the moment, the Rolling 
Frito-Lay court’s interpretation of Water Wheel as unfaithful to Supreme 
Court precedent, one can recognize restraint in the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach. The Ninth Circuit’s approach, even in allowing tribal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers more easily than a broad reading of Hicks would permit, 
does not expand tribal jurisdiction beyond its traditional limits. It certainly 
does not suggest that a doctrine based on tribal sovereignty could ever 
extend to nonmembers beyond reservation land, or even beyond reservation 
lands held by the tribe. Instead, it purports to maintain the limits on tribal 
jurisdiction set by Montana.  
As the Ninth Circuit has summarized, tribal jurisdiction is “cabined by 
geography.”120 If the claim arises on tribal land, under Water Wheel, the 
tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers provides a basis for tribal civil 
jurisdiction. If the claim arises on reservation lands held in fee by 
nonmembers, then the tribe only has civil jurisdiction if one of the Montana 
exceptions is satisfied. If the claim arises outside of reservation lands, the 
tribal court has no jurisdiction over the nonmember. Ultimately, under the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach, tribal jurisdiction is limited to claims arising on 
reservation lands.  
  
                                                                                                             
 117. Id.  
 118. See id. at *2-3. 
 119. Id. at *3 (citation omitted). 
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C. The Eighth & Tenth Circuits’ Approach  
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits (as well as the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona in the Rolling Frito-Lay case) have taken a different 
path than the Ninth Circuit. These courts have adopted a broad 
interpretation of the Hicks and Plains Commerce Bank decisions, 
effectively ignoring both the location factor and the related tribal power to 
exclude non-Indians as a basis for civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. By 
the time Water Wheel was decided in the Ninth Circuit, the settled rule in 
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits was that Montana’s analytical framework 
would always apply to the issue of whether a tribal court had jurisdiction 
over a nonmember defendant, regardless of where the claim arose.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Navajo 
tribal court lacked jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in MacArthur v. 
San Juan County,121 applying the same interpretation of Hicks as the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Arizona in Rolling Frito-Lay. The case 
arose from a dispute over alleged time-card fraud between several 
employee-plaintiffs and the defendant-employer, San Juan County Health 
Services District, which operated a clinic at which the plaintiffs worked.122 
The clinic was located within the Navajo Reservation on fee land held by 
the state of Utah, and subsequently turned over to the Utah Navajo Health 
Systems, a tribal entity.123 The plaintiffs, some of whom were Navajo 
members, filed their complaint in Navajo tribal court against several 
defendants, almost all of whom were nonmembers.124 After an evidentiary 
hearing, the Navajo court issued several orders, including an injunction; 
failure to fully follow the tribal court’s orders triggered a penalty of 
$10,000 per day for every day after a certain date that the defendants failed 
to comply.125   
The MacArthur court reasoned that the only circumstance, which triggers 
the application of Montana’s analytical framework, is the attempt by a 
tribal court to assert jurisdiction over a nonmember.126 It made clear that, in 
its view, Hicks had diminished the importance of the location factor: “The 
notion that Montana’s applicability turns, in part, on whether the regulated 
activity took place on non-Indian land was finally put to rest in Hicks.”127 
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The MacArthur court also discussed the power to exclude nonmembers as a 
basis for tribal civil jurisdiction; it noted that even if the location factor still 
determined applicability of Montana’s analysis, Montana would apply 
because the clinic was operated on non-Indian land.128  
In 2011, the same year Water Wheel was decided, the Tenth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Montana was again applied in Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. 
Stidham.129 Simply stated, the dispute in Crowe & Dunlevy was over 
whether Crowe & Dunlevy, a law firm with no tribal affiliation, could be 
required by a tribal court to refund payments it received from its Indian 
client.130 The applicability of Montana, because it involved a nonmember 
over whom a tribal court sought to exert jurisdiction, was undisputed here 
and therefore not discussed at length, unlike in the earlier MacArthur 
case.131 Also unlike in MacArthur, the court did not discuss, even in dictum, 
the power to exclude nonmembers as a basis for jurisdiction.132 But the 
court cited Montana, Hicks, and Plains Commerce Bank for the rule that 
“[t]here is a presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,” 
except when the Montana exceptions apply.133 In this case, neither of the 
two exceptions was found to apply, so the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.134 
The Crowe & Dunlevy decision, in its simplicity, represents the settled 
nature of the question in the Tenth Circuit: Montana’s analysis always 
applies if a tribal court attempts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember.  
The Eighth Circuit has similarly adopted a broad interpretation of 
Montana in light of Hicks and Plains Commerce Bank. The shift toward an 
analysis based on the status of the litigants is readily apparent from a 
comparison of the following cases. In Hornell Brewing Company v. 
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court,135 a pre-Hicks decision, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendant breweries. The dispute originally arose from the 
nonmember breweries naming a malt liquor they manufactured after a 
revered Indian leader, Crazy Horse.136 The Eighth Circuit viewed the 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 1070 n.7. 
 129. 640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 130. Id. at 1145-46. 
 131. See id. at 1151. 
 132. See King et al., supra note 57, at 762 (emphasizing that the Tenth Circuit did not 
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dispute as being over the “manufacture, sale, and distribution of Crazy 
Horse Malt Liquor,” rather than the property rights of Crazy Horse’s 
estate.137 Because all of the breweries’ activities took place completely 
outside of the reservation, the Montana exceptions were held not to be 
applicable.138  
The post-Hicks decision in Nord v. Kelly139 illustrates a shift in the 
Eighth Circuit’s application of the Montana rule and a new, special 
emphasis on the second of the two Montana exceptions. Factually, this case 
was very similar to Strate because it too involved an accident on a public 
right-of-way within the limits of a reservation.140 The original lawsuit was 
commenced by a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians in 
tribal court against a nonmember truck driver and its nonmember owner.141 
The plaintiff alleged that the nonmember defendant was responsible for 
injuries that occurred in an automobile accident on a state highway within 
the Red Lake Indian Reservation.142 The court explained that the location 
factor (“the ownership status of land”) had been made one of several 
considerations that factored into application of the second Montana 
exception.143 “[T]he key concept,” it reasoned, “is that the tribal authority to 
regulate nonmember activities [and therefore to have adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over such activities] exists where it is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations.”144  
Even more recently, in Attorney’s Process and Investigation Services, 
Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa,145 the Eighth Circuit 
applied a Montana analysis that considered the location factor under the 
second Montana exception. The claim in that case arose from the dramatic 
dispute between two factions vying for control of the Sac & Fox of the 
Mississippi in Iowa and the lucrative Meskwaki Bingo Casino Hotel.146 The 
dispute culminated in one faction occupying the casino and the other hiring 
Attorney's Process and Investigation Services (“API”), which forcibly 
                                                                                                             
 137. Id. at 1091. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 520 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 140. See id. at 851. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
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intervened with thirty agents.147 After the dispute ended, the recognized 
government of the tribe sued API, a nonmember entity in tribal court.148  
The Eighth Circuit applied Montana’s analytical framework despite the 
claim clearly arising on tribal land, citing Hicks for the principle that 
“Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”149 The court 
nonetheless found that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the nonmember 
defendant, API, because the second Montana exception was satisfied; API’s 
raid on the Meskwaki Bingo Casino Hotel and subsequent conduct 
threatened the tribe’s “political integrity,” “economic security,” and “health 
and welfare.”150 Furthermore, in its analysis of the second Montana 
exception, the court held that since the claim arose on tribal land, the tribe’s 
traditional retained power to exclude nonmembers also supported tribal 
civil jurisdiction over the nonmember conduct.151  
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have, unlike the Ninth Circuit, interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s decisions as diminishing the importance of the 
location factor and tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers. Applying Hicks 
broadly, as illustrated by the aforementioned cases, the location factor has 
been buried in the Montana analysis rather than considered as a threshold 
issue. Also, along with the location factor, the traditional power to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal land as a basis for tribal civil jurisdiction has 
diminished in importance. In summary, in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
there has been a clear shift away from a theory of civil jurisdiction based on 
the location of where the claim arose, in favor of a theory based on the 
status of the litigants.  
D. Overview of Policy Considerations  
The issue of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers implicates several 
sensitive interests and risks. It would be unrealistic to address this complex 
issue in isolation from the interests and policies underlying the problem. 
This subpart draws on the background material described above and 
outlines the relevant interests, beginning with the interests of nonmember 
defendants and briefly addressing the corresponding interests of Indian 
plaintiffs, tribal courts, and the federal government.  
Nonmember defendants undoubtedly have several reasons to resist the 
assertion of jurisdiction by a tribal court. The worst-case scenario for a 
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nonmember defendant in tribal court is that he or she will be “subjected to a 
hostile forum, a small and insular jury pool, and a lack of constitutional 
safeguards.”152 A defendant may also have heard “[h]orror stories of multi-
million dollar judgments, unfamiliar laws, and limited appeal rights . . . .”153 
Commentator Westesen’s horror story of choice is drawn from the case 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Red Wolf,154 a case in which he 
was involved.155 Red Wolf arose from a wrongful death action that pitted a 
nonmember defendant, the Burlington Northern Railroad Company, against 
a biased tribal judge and jury who eventually awarded the plaintiffs $250 
million in damages.156 Before the trial, the tribal court judge gave a speech 
to the jury in the Crow language, telling them, “Crows, you know, I don’t 
have to tell you, bodies in the past, bodies are scattered along the railway. 
Now is the day . . . This is the Crow’s proceedings. This is our means of 
survival.”157 As described above, the tribal court’s judgment was eventually 
reversed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, whose 
decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,158 but this outcome did not 
make up for the actions of the trial court in Red Wolf. At the very least, the 
case shows that defendants’ interests in not having claims adjudicated by a 
tribal court should be taken seriously.  
Apart from the risk of unfairness, a defendant may have other strategic 
reasons for wanting the case to be brought in a different forum. “The 
competition for civil jurisdiction takes on immediacy because sometimes 
the substantive law rules for the resolution of a given case or controversy 
may vary depending on which courthouse--state or tribal--issues the final 
judgment.”159 Moreover, the procedures and attitudes, some of which are 
derived from pre-Columbian principles, in tribal courts may seem foreign 
and unfamiliar to nonmember defendants.160 
 Against the interests of nonmember defendants, naturally, weigh the 
interests of tribal plaintiffs, who may favor tribal courts for the mirror-
                                                                                                             
 152. Westesen, supra note 10, at 9-9. 
 153. Id. at 9-1. 
 154. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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 156. See Westesen, supra note 10, at 9-6 to -10. See generally Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. 
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opposite reasons defendants wish to avoid them: the familiarity of the laws 
and procedures, hope of trying the case before a favorable jury, and the 
possibility of winning large damages. Tribes also have interests that should 
be considered, including an interest in protecting their members, promoting 
their legitimate regulatory interests, and providing a forum that is aware of 
tribal members' values.161 And, finally, the federal government’s interests in 
promoting tribal self-government and the development of tribal court 
systems must be considered.162  
III. Thesis 
A. Introduction 
This part will show that the Ninth Circuit's approach to the application of 
the analytical framework derived from Montana, as explained in its 
decision in Water Wheel, is most consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent and best supported by policy considerations. As in Water Wheel, 
the issue of whether a tribal court has civil jurisdiction over a nonmember 
should be addressed first by considering where the claim arose. Under the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach in Water Wheel, if the claim arises on tribal lands 
within the borders of the reservation, the tribal court has jurisdiction over 
the nonmember defendant based on the inherent power of the tribe to 
exclude nonmembers. But if the claim arose on alienated lands within the 
reservation held in fee by a nonmember, then the tribal court is presumed, 
under Montana’s general rule, to lack jurisdiction unless one of the 
exceptions apply. If the claim arose outside of the reservation altogether, 
then the tribal court cannot have civil jurisdiction over a nonmember 
defendant.  
In order to show that the Ninth Circuit’s approach should be favored 
over the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ interpretation, this part’s analysis will 
first explain, in subpart B, that Montana and its progeny consistently 
uphold tribes’ inherent power to exclude nonmembers as a basis for civil 
jurisdiction, regardless of nonmembers’ consent. Second, subpart C will 
show that the decision in Hicks should be interpreted narrowly, both under 
the Montana line of cases and under the limited language of the Hicks 
                                                                                                             
 161. See EXC, Inc. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct., 9 Am. Tribal Law 176, 188 (Navajo 2010) 
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opinion itself. Finally, subpart D shows that policy considerations favor the 
widespread adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Water Wheel, over 
that of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. 
B. The Power to Exclude & Nonmember Consent: Interpreting Montana’s 
Progeny 
Some commentators have argued that an approach is needed which will 
reconcile the Montana and Merrion lines of cases, suggesting that they are 
in conflict or diverge.163 Another has argued that the line of cases handed 
down by the U.S. Supreme Court over the past thirty years (and especially 
Plains Commerce Bank) spell the slow but certain decline of tribal civil 
jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty.164 This subpart argues in favor of the 
contrary conclusions for both arguments: first, that tribal civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers remains feasible and, second, that Montana and Merrion 
are in fact consistent with both one another and subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions. Finding the correct approach to tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers when the claim arises on tribal land is not a matter of 
balancing Montana against Merrion or any other case, but of discerning 
how the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions regarding tribal civil jurisdiction 
fit together. 
 “While the Court has turned back claims of civil jurisdiction in [the 
cases following Montana], it has done so without foreclosing the possibility 
of a different result in another case involving different facts.”165 This view 
of the cases is supported by a review of the holdings, at least as viewed 
through the lens of the issue at hand. The Court has consistently upheld 
tribes’ power to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands. The decision in 
Montana, for instance, took for granted the tribal power to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal land. Its reasoning was that because non-Indians 
could no longer be excluded from the land in question, land held in fee by 
nonmembers, the tribe had lost its authority to regulate activates on the 
land.166  
Merrion explained, “Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain 
subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them. This power necessarily 
includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued 
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presence, or on reservation conduct . . . .”167 Applying this principle, the 
Court held that the power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation 
would have been sufficient by itself to support a tax on nonmember 
activities on tribal.168 The authority to regulate, explained by Merrion, 
creates the presumption that the tribal courts have a corresponding 
adjudicatory civil jurisdiction over the activities. Under LaPlante, “[c]ivil 
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless 
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.”169  
The Court also emphasized the compatibility of Montana and Merrion in 
Atkinson Trading Company. There the Court explained, “Merrion involved 
a tax that only applied to activity occurring on the reservation, and its 
holding is therefore easily reconcilable with the Montana-Strate line of 
authority."170 Keeping in mind the compatibility of Merrion and the 
Montana line of cases can help resolve a concern raised by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Arizona in its Rolling Frito-Lay decision, when it 
declined to follow Water Wheel. The district court stated, "[S]ubjecting 
non-Indians to the jurisdiction of a tribal court without their consent would 
subject them to an entity outside the Constitution. . . . Government with the 
consent of the governed is everything in America.”171 The district court’s 
assertion that a nonmember can never be subjected to tribal jurisdiction 
absent consent is puzzling in light of Merrion, which flatly contradicts this 
idea. The Merrion Court, in no uncertain terms, explained, “Indian 
sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember . . . .”172 In 
other words, when a basis for tribal jurisdiction exists, nonmembers’ lack of 
consent is irrelevant. The district court’s flat contradiction of Merrion only 
makes sense if Hicks is allowed to refute what the court has repeatedly 
asserted: that its decisions on tribal jurisdiction are consistent and 
compatible with one another. As seen in practice, then, in the Rolling Frito-
Lay opinion, a broad reading of Hicks means taking the awkward step of 
sweeping some U.S. Supreme Court precedents under the rug, ignoring 
their plain language and muddling their rules.  
 Furthermore, Atkinson Trading Company is only one in a series of cases 
interpreting Montana that consistently confirm tribes' power to exclude 
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nonmembers. As will be recalled, Bourland confirms, at least through 
negative implication, that tribes have “the right to exclude and to regulate” 
lands of which they have the “absolute and undisturbed use.”173 In Strate, 
the Court also stated, “We ‘can readily agree,’ in accord with Montana . . . 
that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal 
land.”174 As in Bourland, the Strate opinion confirms the tribal power to 
exclude by negative implication, as it rejects its application to the case at 
hand. In holding the stretch of highway involved in Strate to be the 
equivalent of non-Indian fee land, the Court summarizes that the tribes 
therefore “have retained no gatekeeping right. So long as the stretch is 
maintained as part of the State’s highway, the Tribes cannot assert a 
landowner’s right to occupy and exclude.”175 From Montana and Merrion 
through Bourland, Strate, and Atkinson Trading Company there is a clear 
pattern. The Court has consistently maintained the coherency of its 
Montana line of cases and the principle, articulated in Merrion and 
LaPlante, that tribes’ power to exclude nonmembers forms a basis for tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Even Plains Commerce Bank fits this pattern, despite initial criticisms 
that it was particularly destructive of tribal sovereignty. Although one 
commentator has criticized Plains Commerce Bank as “a decision that 
works to the undeniable detriment of tribes while lavishing ill-gained 
benefits on possibly exploitative outsiders,”176 the real effect of the decision 
was probably less dire. For example, the same commentator argued that 
Plains Commerce Bank’s treatment of the second Montana exception 
would essentially render it useless.177 He interpreted it as “creating 
impossible standards for the application of the second Montana 
exception.”178 As it turned out, only a short time after this criticism, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the “absurdly high standard”179 had been satisfied 
in Attorney’s Process and Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of 
Mississippi in Iowa.180 Quite simply, this example shows that the Plains 
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Commerce Bank decision has not foreclosed the possibility of finding tribal 
civil jurisdiction.  
Instead, the Plains Commerce Bank decision maintains the Court’s 
reliance, from Montana onward, on the location factor and the related 
power to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands as a basis for tribal civil 
jurisdiction. It is important to remember the factual differences between 
Plains Commerce Bank and Merrion: the regulation upheld in Merrion was 
of nonmember activity on tribal lands, not the sale of alienated lands held 
by a nonmember. Under the circumstances of Plains Commerce Bank, it 
was appropriate for the court to analyze the case under Montana’s general 
rule and exceptions. While the power to exclude nonmembers forms part of 
tribes’ authority over nonmember activities on tribal land, it does not form a 
basis for tribal court’s civil jurisdiction when the claim arises on alienated 
land or off reservation. Importantly, tribal jurisdiction (and indeed tribal 
sovereignty) is “cabined by geography.”181 
Additionally, Plains Commerce Bank might only have a very narrow 
application. One commentator favors this interpretation, writing that “in 
Plains Commerce Bank, as in Hicks and Strate, the Court avoided ruling on 
the fundamental question of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indian 
defendants.”182 Additionally, the Court may be adopting an intentionally 
narrow approach so as to allow tribal jurisdiction to mature and develop 
naturally, without extensive judicial interference.183 The unremarkable truth 
may be that the Court intended only to “carve[] out the regulation of the 
sale of non-Indian fee land from Montana’s domain,”184 rather than 
“commit[] an error that staggers somewhere between a blunder and a 
crime,” as another commentator argues.185 As Freud reportedly said, 
“sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.”  
Contrary to the view that Montana and Merrion are in opposition to one 
another, the Supreme Court has neither completely repudiated the 
significance of where a claim arose (the location factor) nor rejected tribal 
power to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands. The Rolling Frito-Lay 
court was therefore incorrect in concluding that the power to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal land was rejected by Montana as a basis for civil 
jurisdiction. On the contrary, Montana itself is fully compatible with a 
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conception of tribal civil jurisdiction based on tribes’ power to exclude 
nonmembers. This is because Montana and its progeny apply to 
nonmember activities on alienated reservation lands, land held in fee by 
non-Indians. The Supreme Court’s decision in Merrion and its language in 
Plains Commerce Bank (on the importance of nonmember consent to tribal 
regulation) are inconsistent if Montana’s analytical framework applies to 
tribal and alienated lands alike. Montana and the line of cases that have 
interpreted it over the past thirty years have consistently upheld tribes’ 
inherent power to exclude nonmembers from reservation lands that have not 
be alienated.  This principle is accurately described in the Ninth Circuit’s 
Water Wheel decision and, properly understood, provides a basis for tribal 
civil jurisdiction over nonmember defendants when the claim arises on 
tribal land. 
C. The Location Factor: Interpreting Nevada v. Hicks 
The location factor has importance not because it possesses some 
talismanic significance, but rather because it has historically been an 
important part of the rationale underlying tribal court’s jurisdiction. Tribal 
jurisdiction is derived conceptually from the tribe’s control over a specific 
geographic area, among other sources, and the conditional right of entry 
allowed to nonmembers.186 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Water Wheel, 
which interprets Hicks as being limited to the specific issue in that case and 
not applicable to the question of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember 
defendants in general,187 is the most accurate interpretation of both Hicks 
and the Montana line of decisions.  
The opposite assumption is central to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona’s reasoning in the Rolling Frito-Lay decision. As 
discussed above, the district court reasoned that Montana would not be 
regarded as “the pathmarking case” if it did not apply broadly to tribal land 
as well as non-Indian land.188 The district court’s reasoning in the Rolling 
Frito-Lay opinion relies especially on the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Hicks.189 Specifically, the district court points to the passage in Hicks in 
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which the Court interprets language from Montana as clearly “imply[ing] 
‘that the general rule . . . applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.’”190  
Contrary to the Rolling Frito-Lay decision, Montana did not repudiate 
the significance of the location of where a claim arose; rather it preserves 
this factor and thereby protects tribal jurisdiction. This is clear from the 
opinion itself, when the Court explained that the Montana exceptions would 
allow tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers “even on non-Indian fee 
lands.”191 The Court merely stated that the Montana exceptions are 
effective on non-Indian lands, leaving undisturbed the distinction between 
Indian land and non-Indian land.192 It is therefore misguided to assume that 
favoring tribal sovereignty must be in contradiction of the Montana 
holding. If Hicks must be interpreted broadly, as rejecting the location 
factor as a threshold issue, then it is clearly inconsistent with the actual text 
of Montana.  
Such an interpretation of Hicks would also be inconsistent with 
Montana’s progeny, the cases that have explained the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of tribal civil jurisdiction. The location factor was determinative of 
whether Montana’s analytical framework applied in Bourland, where 
Montana was held to be applicable because the land that the tribe sought to 
regulate had been alienated.193 Similarly, in Strate, Montana was applicable 
precisely because the right-of-way within the borders of the reservation was 
held to be “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, 
non-Indian land.”194 Relying on the location factor, the Court concluded, 
“Our decision in Montana, accordingly, governs this case,” and proceeded 
to apply Montana’s analytical framework.195  
On the other hand, language in Hicks would seem, at first glance, to 
mandate the reordering of the Montana analysis with the location factor 
diminished to a place as one among several circumstances considered under 
the second Montana factor. For instance, the Court explains Montana as 
“apply[ing] to both Indian and non-Indian land,” seeming to disregard the 
location factor as a threshold issue determining whether Montana 
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applies.196 “The ownership status of land,” the Court continues, “in other 
words, is only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of 
the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government 
or to control internal relations.’”197 The Court seemed firmly set against 
making the location factor determinative of whether Montana applies, and 
this is the interpretation of Hicks that the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have 
adopted.  
But given Hicks’s apparent inconsistency with the rest of Montana’s 
progeny, it makes sense to distinguish it, as the Ninth Circuit does in Water 
Wheel.198 Distinguishing the case does not mean denouncing it as erroneous 
or hostile to tribal interests; there are several reasons for limiting Hicks to 
the issue and circumstances that it addressed. As a commentator points out, 
Hicks involved two factors that make it “unique”: (1) “the State’s interest in 
prosecuting crimes off-reservation, which was the dispositive factor,” and 
(2) the risk tribal courts would “effectively control state officers acting 
under state law.”199 Furthermore, as both the Water Wheel court and the 
commentator point out, the Hicks opinion expressly limited its holding to 
the issue addressed.200 As the Hicks Court explains, in a footnote, “Our 
holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction 
over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-
court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”201 In Hicks, as 
sweeping and portentous as some of its language may have been interpreted 
to be, the Court was simply unwilling to take the radical step of altering 
Montana’s analytical framework. As the Ninth Circuit concludes, “Hicks is 
best understood as the narrow decision it explicitly claims to be.”202 
Under both the Court’s case law and the test of Hicks itself, the approach 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Water Wheel more accurately reflects the 
current law than the approach taken by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, 
which have interpreted Hicks as applying to tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendants in general. Such a broad interpretation goes against 
the text of the Hicks opinion and contradicts the reasoning in three decades 
worth of Supreme Court opinions. 
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D. Policy Considerations Favoring the Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
The policy considerations identified above in Part II.D, with the 
exception of furthering defendants’ interests, are promoted by the approach 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Water Wheel. The Ninth Circuit’s approach 
avoids undercutting the policies advanced in Hicks, protects the unique 
interests of Indian plaintiffs, promotes tribal self-government, and 
encourages the development of tribal court systems. When given closer 
examination, even the interests of nonmember defendants do not suffer as 
greatly as one might expect, especially with regard to the procedural 
safeguards available to them in tribal courts. Overall, the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach offers the best balance of interests and furthers the policies that 
inform decisions such as Montana, Merrion, and Hicks. 
From a policy perspective, the Hicks Court was primarily concerned 
about striking the proper balance between state interests and tribal interests, 
not the balance between member and nonmember parties’ interests. Hicks 
held that the tribe lacked the authority to limit state officials in their 
investigation of an offense under state law that had taken place outside of 
the reservation.203 A narrow reading of Hicks that limits its holding to its 
circumstances does just as adequate a job of preserving the proper balance 
between tribal interests and state authority to conduct investigations as a 
very broad reading would. Each interpretation protects state officials from 
the undue interference of tribal regulations, but the broader interpretation 
gives a windfall to nonmember defendants whose interests do not 
necessarily coincide with the interests of state governments.  
Giving a more limited reading to the Hicks decision and upholding tribal 
civil jurisdiction over nonmember defendants when the claim arises on 
tribal lands is certainly, in itself, not favorable to defendants. As a result of 
the Water Wheel decision, nonmember defendants will be more frequently 
and somewhat more easily subjected to the risks that come with being sued 
in tribal court. But to the extent that defendants’ fears are potentially 
realized in any particular case, they are matters separate from the question 
at hand, the issue of tribal civil jurisdiction. Bias and runaway damages are 
of course lamentable, but limitation of tribal jurisdiction is not a solution to 
these problems. Especially considering the rarity of extreme cases such as 
Red Wolf, the curtailment of tribal jurisdiction for the sake of protecting 
nonmember defendants is simply overkill.  
Furthermore, concerns about nonmember defendants being subjected to 
unjust procedures or denied due process are probably unrealistic. As the 
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Supreme Court noted in LaPlante, “the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 
1302, provides non-Indians with various protections against unfair 
treatment in the tribal courts.”204 That statute specifically provides that 
defendants are entitled to equal protection of the laws and due process.205 
This makes the fretful language in Plains Commerce Bank (describing tribal 
sovereignty as existing outside the U.S. Constitution and beyond the reach 
of the Bill of Rights) seem slightly exaggerated, if not mistaken and 
alarmist.206 Fortunately for nonmember defendants, their interests have not 
been neglected by Congress, as evidenced by the existence of Section 1302.  
In point of fact, nonmembers’ interests have not been forgotten by tribal 
governments either. For example, the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation 
has stated, “While our laws are not covered under the Constitution, they are 
American laws of a unique American sovereign governing system. . . . 
[T]he Navajo Nation has safeguards in place to afford due process to all 
individuals subject to our jurisdiction.”207 The Navajo Court also 
commented that “[t]hroughout the Montana–Strate line of cases, there runs 
the implicit notion that tribes and tribal laws are, somehow, foreign, and 
consequently hostile to non-members.”208 In refuting this implication, the 
Navajo Court then cited numerous laws passed by the Navajo Nation, 
which closely mirror the protections offered by the U.S. Constitution and 
Bill of Rights.209 Nonmember defendants in tribal court thus enjoy the 
protection of not only federal law, but also tribal law. Furthermore, the 
geographically limited nature of tribal jurisdiction and the general rule of 
Montana provide extra barriers to tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember 
defendants. 
Moreover, Indian plaintiffs’ interests in pursuing their claim in tribal 
court should not be sacrificed with so little consideration for what they 
stand to lose. As the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation has noted, the 
Navajo Nation has an interest in providing Indian plaintiffs with a forum 
that shares their values.210 Beyond the unique interest Indian parties might 
have, Indian plaintiffs’ interests in choosing a tribal forum are no different 
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than those hopes or concerns that influence any other plaintiff’s choice of 
forum--factors such as convenience of location and familiarity with the 
laws and procedures. Plaintiffs might often have the choice of more than 
one forum in which to bring their claims; this is simply a fact of life in a 
country with a federal system of government.  
A narrow reading of Hicks also encourages the development of tribal 
courts and supports tribal self-government. As the Court recognized in 
LaPlante, the federal government has a “longstanding policy of 
encouraging tribal self-government.”211 Going even further, the Court 
stated, “Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government . . . and the 
Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development. 
Although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject to 
substantial federal limitation . . . their civil jurisdiction is not similarly 
restricted.”212 Interpreting Hicks so broadly as to fence in tribal court 
jurisdiction, limiting the power of court to decide even disputes arising on 
tribal lands within the reservation when Montana’s exceptions cannot be 
satisfied, would place a substantial limitation on tribal civil jurisdiction. It 
would blunt the effectiveness of tribal courts, reducing their utility to tribal 
members and frustrating the goals of the federal government.  
Policy considerations therefore weigh heavily in favor of adopting the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach and distinguishing Hicks from the main line of 
cases descending from Montana. A measured interpretation of Hicks strikes 
the correct balance between the interests of state and tribal governments’ 
interests, thus fulfilling the main concerns manifested in that case, without 
giving nonmember defendants a windfall. In any case, the interests of non-
member defendants are by no means disregarded or left unprotected under 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Finally, preserving tribal civil jurisdiction 
over claims arising on tribal lands has the effect of promoting self-
government, protecting the interests of Indian plaintiffs, and protecting the 
legitimate interests of tribal governments.  
IV. Critique of Thesis 
The approach offered in the Ninth Circuit’s Water Wheel decision and 
advocated in Part III of this Comment is not without problems, chief among 
them being the potentially incompatible language in Plains Commerce 
Bank. Furthermore, the Water Wheel decision could be criticized as relying 
too heavily on a property-based theory of jurisdiction and as perpetuating 
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the complexity of the current analysis applied to determine when a tribal 
court has jurisdiction. Perhaps even more importantly in this context, as a 
practical matter, increasing the reach of tribal court’s jurisdiction is 
arguably disadvantageous to other tribal interests (such as tribes’ economic 
interests). Each of these critiques should be given a fair hearing, but none of 
them are completely substantiated, as will be shown.   
The first and perhaps most important criticism to take note of is the 
opinion, or at least one reading of the opinion, in Plains Commerce Bank.  
The validity of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Water Wheel is difficult to 
reconcile with language from Plains Commerce Bank regarding the location 
factor. For example, the Plains Commerce Bank Court stated, “[T]ribes do 
not, as a general matter, possess authority over non-Indians who come 
within their borders.”213 In even stronger language, the Court explained that 
the “general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities taking 
place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember’s 
activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians . . . .”214 These 
passages, citing Montana and Oliphant, could be interpreted as implying 
that Montana’s analysis applies to all reservation lands regardless of 
ownership.  
As damaging as these implications could be for the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Montana line of cases in Water Wheel, the treatment of 
the location factor in Plains Commerce Bank must also be recognized as 
rather ambiguous. The location factor is, after all, considered in the Plains 
Commerce Bank analysis, but not where the Eighth or Tenth Circuit would 
have considered it. Instead, the Court considers the location factor (albeit 
briefly) in its analysis of Montana’s first exception.215 Thus, while the 
Court does cite Hicks for the principle that “[t]he status of the land is 
relevant ‘insofar as it bears on the application of . . . Montana’s exceptions 
to [this] case,’”216 its analysis reflects a slightly different take on Hicks than 
either the Eighth or Tenth Circuit employs. The reason for this may be that 
the key distinction in Plains Commerce Bank is not between regulation of 
tribal lands versus non-Indian fee lands, but rather a dichotomy between 
tribal regulation of non-Indian conduct and tribal regulation of the sale of 
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non-Indian land.217 In short, if the analysis of the location factor in Plains 
Commerce Bank departs from the norm, it may be because of the unique 
(and distinguishable) circumstances of the case.218  
Beyond the issues presented by Supreme Court decisions, another 
problem is that in many jurisdictions the drift over the last three decades 
seems to have been in favor of making Montana’s exceptions the general 
test for tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. The shift illustrated by the 
distance between the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in Hornell Brewing 
Company v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court
219 (a pre-Hicks decision) and in 
Nord v. Kelly
220 (a post-Hicks decision) has emphasized the status of the 
litigants rather than ownership of the land where the claim arose.221 
Consequently, a transition to the approach taken in Water Wheel, even if 
favored by policy considerations, might create greater uncertainty and 
inconsistency, even as it attempts to resolve the present confusion. The 
undesirable result of straying from the beaten path would be more litigation 
and squandering of judicial resources to settle a basic procedural issue. 
While this Comment takes the stance that a broad interpretation of the 
decision in Hicks raises more questions than it answers, the broader 
interpretation has deeply influenced both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ 
application of Montana’s analytical framework.  
Another critique could be aimed at the apparent arbitrariness of the 
location factor, which hitches the jurisdiction analysis to property 
ownership. The view that the applicability of Montana’s analysis should not 
turn on the ownership of the property where the claim arose ignores the fact 
that the location factor has not been completely dropped from even the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuit’s approach. Rather, under the broadest reading of 
Hicks, the location factor has only been relegated to the analysis of the 
second Montana exception. The location factor has thus diminished in its 
importance in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ interpretation, but it has never 
been completely rejected. On the other hand, though, critics of the Water 
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Wheel approach could correctly point out that under the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, a tribal court might have jurisdiction over one nonmember 
defendant when the claim arises on tribal lands but, strangely, lack 
jurisdiction over an identical claim arising on non-Indian lands within the 
same reservation. 
In addition to this legal concern, there could be concerns about the 
practical and economic consequences of making nonmember defendants 
more susceptible to the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. Because giving 
greater weight to the location factor makes it somewhat easier to obtain 
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants, it is possible that nonmembers 
may be discouraged from entering into business relationships with Indians 
on tribal lands. This would mean that an approach, which seems to 
empower Indian tribes and support self-determination, actually has the 
ironic effect of isolating reservation businesses and entrepreneurs from 
nonmember investors and developers.  
On the other hand, the opposite conclusion has been urged with equal 
confidence. Commentators have argued that the uncertainty over the scope 
of tribal jurisdiction has “[n]o doubt . . . increased tribal reluctance to enter 
potentially economically beneficial relationships with nonmembers for fear 
they would lack the jurisdiction necessary to regulate and adjudicate action 
against nonmembers living, working, or doing business on tribal lands.”222 
From an economic policy perspective, the difference between Ninth 
Circuit’s approach in Water Wheel (higher risks for nonmember 
defendants) and the broad reading of Hicks favored by the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits (creating greater uncertainty for everyone) remains unclear at best.  
While the approach offered by the Ninth Circuit in Water Wheel has 
several advantages, its compatibility with Plains Commerce Bank is at least 
questionable. Furthermore, the Water Wheel approach could expose 
nonmember defendants to an increased risk of being sued in tribal court 
when they enter business relationships, offer services, or even travel 
through tribal lands. When such lawsuits do occur, critics of Water Wheel 
could correctly label the differing results, depending on property 
ownership, as somewhat arbitrary. Finally, critics might argue that Water 
Wheel will lead to just as much economic harm, due to the risks it imposes 
on nonmembers, as the previous uncertainty over how to determine tribal 
civil jurisdiction.  
  
                                                                                                             
 222. King et al., supra note 57, at 758. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Water Wheel provides the 
approach to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember defendants that 
(compared to the approaches of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits) most 
accurately reflects Supreme Court precedents, protects tribal sovereignty, 
and advances Congress’s interest in promoting tribal self-government. As 
the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the law, application of the analytical 
framework from Montana (consisting of a general rule and its two 
exceptions) hinges on the distinction between Indian and non-Indian land, a 
distinction which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held to be of 
pivotal importance. The existence of the Montana test and the decision in 
Hicks must not be interpreted as extinguishing tribal power to exclude 
nonmembers from tribal land as a separate basis for tribal civil jurisdiction. 
Any other approach will contradict precedents such as Merrion, the 
overwhelming majority of Montana’s progeny, and the federal 
government’s stated interest in promoting tribal self-determination. 
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